Security and trust
This page summarises what protects you when you use Dynamo, what has and has not been reviewed, and how to report a problem. Every feature named here carries one of three labels:
- Live: usable today in Control Mode (no money anywhere) or on a local chain or testnet.
- Preview: built, behind a switch that is off by default.
- Release-gated: needs real money, live credit card keys or operator-mode ramps. Not offered
in this release: live credit card keys and live Circle keys refuse startup.
Nothing on this page is a promise about real money.
Audit status
Dynamo is not yet externally audited. That covers the contracts, the core and every client. An audit package (contract version 2, the engine and its cryptography, and the hosted service: scope, threat model, invariants and known issues) has been prepared for an auditor.
What protects users and partners
Non-custodial posture (Live)
- Stablecoin budgets sit in escrow contracts that only the contract rules can move. Neither
contract version gives the vault owner a function that moves, redirects or freezes escrowed funds.
- In contract version 2 the vault owner can set the fee within a hard cap written into the
contract, change the fee collector, and pause new budgets, new streams and settlement on streams that are still running, for a bounded time. Its ownership can never be renounced. In contract version 1 the vault owner can set the fee within that contract's own cap and change the fee collector; it cannot pause.
- Pausing never blocks release, refunds, revocation, settling signed work on a revoked or expired
stream, or the return of unspent value.
- Outside local development chains, the core refuses to start a stablecoin deployment unless the
vault owner and fee collector are multisig wallets that need at least two signers.
- The core never holds another party's key. Configuring a payee's or an oracle's private key into
the core stops it at boot, with the key named (never its value). On the hosted multi-tenant tier, a payer key is refused too. Payees settle with their own keys.
See also the non-custodial posture.
Caps and revocation (Live)
- Every stream has a cap, and spending is checked against the stream's own cap and every parent
cap above it before anything is signed. A request past the cap is refused and nothing past the ceiling is billed.
- Revoking a stream revokes its whole subtree in one step, and the signed revoke record names every
stream it stopped.
- Gateway plugins verify allowance credentials in their own process and fail closed: an absent,
expired, revoked or malformed credential is refused.
Signed records and offline evidence (Live)
- Every voucher is an EIP-712 signature by the stream's own session key. Every budget, delegation,
revocation, freeze and approval writes a signed, hash-linked authority record.
- Signature checks accept only one form of each signature (low
s,vof 27 or 28) and only
canonical base64url credential encodings, tested against one shared set of vectors by the TypeScript, Python, Lua and Go verifiers.
- A budget's evidence file verifies offline: the verifier opens no network connection, re-checks
every digest and signature, and names the element that fails when a single byte is changed. See evidence and disputes.
- Pin the signer when you verify. The verifier checks the file against the engine signer you
give it with --signer. Without a pin it uses the signer named inside the file and prints it, so compare that address with the one your provider published.
- The verifier proves what was signed. It does not look up a chain or a payment processor to
confirm that a settlement landed. The verifier checks every signature and digest in the file. From evidence/1.5.0 on it binds and checks each stream's sessionKeyAddress against the vouchers. Pair the file with on-chain settlement (or the engine-signed payment records) to complete a money proof. It is weakest on Control Mode and the credit card rail, where there is no chain to check.
Tenant isolation (Live)
- On the hosted multi-tenant tier every tenant has its own databases, its own engine signer, its
own data key, its own request quota and its own events.
- A request whose credential does not resolve to exactly one tenant is refused before any tenant
data is opened. Another tenant's ids answer exactly as ids that exist nowhere, and a test aims one tenant's credentials at another tenant's ids on every owner, wire and merchant route.
Keys at rest (Live)
- In a money mode the core holds no payer, payee or oracle key, with one named exception: a per-stream voucher key the core generates for a stream it opens for a payer (credit card top-ups, human payments, stablecoin adoptions), bounded to that stream's cap and payee, sealed at rest per stream. Where a payer supplies its own session signer (as on the adopted rails), the core uses it.
- Session keys and the engine signer key are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM under a 32-byte
deployment key. A hosted instance refuses to start without that key, and refuses any setting that would keep keys in plaintext. A wrong key is refused at startup.
- On the multi-tenant tier each tenant's data key is itself encrypted under the deployment key.
- The deployment key can be rotated on a stopped deployment; an interrupted rotation blocks
startup until it is finished.
Access control
- Owner and wire tokens are compared in constant time. Narrower credentials (for a hook, a payee or
a delegating agent) reach only their own routes and objects; anything else answers 403 credential_scope. (Live)
- Console sessions use
HttpOnly,SameSite=Strictcookies and require a CSRF token on every
change. (Live)
- Organisation roles (viewer, approver, funder, admin) only narrow what the owner can do; a member
outside its role gets 403 role_forbidden. (Live)
- Single sign-on by OIDC or SAML for organisation members. (Preview:
CORE_SSO_OIDCand
CORE_SSO_SAML are off by default and tested against local identity-provider mocks only.)
- Every response carries a deny-by-default set of security headers. On a hosted instance every
public route except the health check is rate-limited per client. (Live)
Production defaults
A hosted instance starts with real money off, metrics on, payload-free logs and keys encrypted at rest. A configuration that would weaken any of these refuses to start and names the reason. (Live)
Real money (Release-gated)
- The credit card rail runs on Stripe TEST keys only. A live Stripe key anywhere in the environment
refuses startup, and a complete live configuration still stops with card_live_release_gated.
- Operator-mode ramps run against Circle's sandbox only, and a live Circle key refuses startup.
Contract addresses and the multisig threshold
Nothing is deployed to a public chain, and no contract address is published yet. Version 2 of the contracts runs on local chains and local forks in this release. When a deployment exists, this page will list each contract address and the signer threshold of the multisig wallets that own the vault and collect its fee.
Reporting a vulnerability
Email security@dynamo.zone. Please do not open a public issue for anything security-sensitive. Include the affected package and version, a reproduction and the impact you see. Any reproducible path where an absent, malformed, expired, revoked or stale credential still gets service is always in scope and treated as the most severe class of report.