Security and trust

This page summarises what protects you when you use Dynamo, what has and has not been reviewed, and how to report a problem. Every feature named here carries one of three labels:

in this release: live credit card keys and live Circle keys refuse startup.

Nothing on this page is a promise about real money.

Audit status

Dynamo is not yet externally audited. That covers the contracts, the core and every client. An audit package (contract version 2, the engine and its cryptography, and the hosted service: scope, threat model, invariants and known issues) has been prepared for an auditor.

What protects users and partners

Non-custodial posture (Live)

contract version gives the vault owner a function that moves, redirects or freezes escrowed funds.

contract, change the fee collector, and pause new budgets, new streams and settlement on streams that are still running, for a bounded time. Its ownership can never be renounced. In contract version 1 the vault owner can set the fee within that contract's own cap and change the fee collector; it cannot pause.

stream, or the return of unspent value.

vault owner and fee collector are multisig wallets that need at least two signers.

the core stops it at boot, with the key named (never its value). On the hosted multi-tenant tier, a payer key is refused too. Payees settle with their own keys.

See also the non-custodial posture.

Caps and revocation (Live)

cap above it before anything is signed. A request past the cap is refused and nothing past the ceiling is billed.

stream it stopped.

expired, revoked or malformed credential is refused.

Signed records and offline evidence (Live)

revocation, freeze and approval writes a signed, hash-linked authority record.

canonical base64url credential encodings, tested against one shared set of vectors by the TypeScript, Python, Lua and Go verifiers.

every digest and signature, and names the element that fails when a single byte is changed. See evidence and disputes.

give it with --signer. Without a pin it uses the signer named inside the file and prints it, so compare that address with the one your provider published.

confirm that a settlement landed. The verifier checks every signature and digest in the file. From evidence/1.5.0 on it binds and checks each stream's sessionKeyAddress against the vouchers. Pair the file with on-chain settlement (or the engine-signed payment records) to complete a money proof. It is weakest on Control Mode and the credit card rail, where there is no chain to check.

Tenant isolation (Live)

own data key, its own request quota and its own events.

data is opened. Another tenant's ids answer exactly as ids that exist nowhere, and a test aims one tenant's credentials at another tenant's ids on every owner, wire and merchant route.

Keys at rest (Live)

deployment key. A hosted instance refuses to start without that key, and refuses any setting that would keep keys in plaintext. A wrong key is refused at startup.

startup until it is finished.

Access control

a delegating agent) reach only their own routes and objects; anything else answers 403 credential_scope. (Live)

change. (Live)

outside its role gets 403 role_forbidden. (Live)

CORE_SSO_SAML are off by default and tested against local identity-provider mocks only.)

public route except the health check is rate-limited per client. (Live)

Production defaults

A hosted instance starts with real money off, metrics on, payload-free logs and keys encrypted at rest. A configuration that would weaken any of these refuses to start and names the reason. (Live)

Real money (Release-gated)

refuses startup, and a complete live configuration still stops with card_live_release_gated.

Contract addresses and the multisig threshold

Nothing is deployed to a public chain, and no contract address is published yet. Version 2 of the contracts runs on local chains and local forks in this release. When a deployment exists, this page will list each contract address and the signer threshold of the multisig wallets that own the vault and collect its fee.

Reporting a vulnerability

Email security@dynamo.zone. Please do not open a public issue for anything security-sensitive. Include the affected package and version, a reproduction and the impact you see. Any reproducible path where an absent, malformed, expired, revoked or stale credential still gets service is always in scope and treated as the most severe class of report.