The non-custodial posture

Dynamo's contracts hold escrow that only the rules can move. This is the protocol's second law (after fail-closed), and it is structural - enforced by the contracts and their invariant suites, not by policy.

The four never-rules

  1. No admin key may withdraw user funds. There is no path - owner,

operator, upgrade, emergency - by which an administrator extracts escrowed value. The invariant suite attacks this directly.

  1. No admin key may redirect funds. Settlement pays the stream's service

node per signed vouchers, less the protocol fee, which goes to the vault's fee collector; refunds pay the budget owner. No other destination exists. The vault owner sets the fee (at most 1000 bps on version 1, 150 bps on version 2) and the fee collector; on version 1 a fee change applies to later settlements of running streams, on version 2 a stream never pays more than the fee at its open.

  1. No admin key may freeze user funds outside the specified paths.

Revocation, hard stops, and holdback windows are rules the parties chose at open; there is no discretionary freeze. The one specified pause is on contract version 2: the vault owner (the deploy script and the core require a Safe multisig off local chains) can pause new opens and live settles for at most 3 days, then must wait 1 day before pausing again. A pause never moves funds and never blocks release, refunds, revocation, grace-window settles or the return of unspent value.

  1. No stored-value balances exist beyond the escrowed budget itself. No

omnibus account, no internal wallet, no float. Close the budget and the remainder returns to the owner; there is nothing left behind to trust anyone with.

What this means per rail

RailCustody reality
ControlNothing to hold - no money exists
EscrowThe vault contract holds the deposit; movement requires signed vouchers (settlement), attested breakpoints or, on version 2, signed breach reports (refunds), the owner's close (version 1) or, on version 2, the permissionless release and unspent-withdrawal calls, each paying its fixed recipient. The contract, not the operator, enforces Σ child settlements ≤ deposit. In a money mode the core holds no payee or oracle key: a core configured with one refuses to boot
CardThe card network holds the authorization; Dynamo instructs captures only up to voucher totals within the ceiling. Payees are paid by split transfer, sourced from the captured charge, to their own connected accounts. A payout to a payee whose destination is not verified is held back (captured, not paid) on the platform's processor account until it verifies; the core alerts after 7 days

Deliberate consequences

contract whose release paths are public code (on version 2, anyone may call releaseHeld and withdrawUnspent, and each always pays its fixed recipient); a card authorization expires by network rules if never captured.

records and exports evidence. Its controls (freeze, revoke, stop, approvals, the main switch) stop or narrow spending, or admit a held action inside the budget's mandate; the only money they move is the settlement of work already signed for, which a revoke settles before it halts.

contract code (invariant-tested; version 1 sealed) and the voucher cryptography (offline-verifiable) - not an operator's ledger.